

Perspectives on Preparedness

October 2002

No. 14



BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
TAUBMAN CENTER FOR STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS
OFFICE FOR DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS

Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness

The Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness (ESDP) is a standing task force of leading practitioners and academic specialists concerned with terrorism and emergency management. Sponsored by the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and the U.S. Department of Justice, the ESDP brings together experts with operational experience in diverse professional fields that are essential to domestic preparedness -- emergency management, law enforcement, fire protection, public health, emergency medicine, national security and defense, and elected office.

The *Perspectives on Preparedness* series aims to provide useful information to the concerned professional communities about how the nation can enhance its ability to respond to the threat of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. The ESDP also produces discussion papers and case studies. Visit the ESDP website at:

WWW.ESDP.ORG

SUSTAINING DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS: CHALLENGES IN A POST 9/11 WORLD

DAVID GRANNIS

Until September 11, 2001, U.S. domestic preparedness--the subset of homeland security activities focusing on preparing for and responding to terrorist attack--was a subject of interest to relatively few people beyond the professional communities involved. Few government officials, academics, and think tank experts with an interest in homeland defense were concerned with the overall sustainability of domestic preparedness programs.

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, followed by the mailing of envelopes containing anthrax spores shortly thereafter, directed massive attention to all aspects of homeland security. Prior to September 11, the threat of terrorism was perceived to be too low to invest deeply in and think long term about domestic preparedness. The sustainability of domestic preparedness programs, therefore, was not a particularly high concern for the U.S. government. The current environment--in which additional terrorist attacks are considered inevitable poses two major challenges:

First, the current political, social, and security climate in the United States has provided the impetus for a significantly larger domestic preparedness budget at

the federal, state, and local levels. If no further terrorist attacks occur, this elevated level of spending will be difficult to maintain, especially if federal, state, and local budget difficulties continue.

Second, with so much focus on domestic preparedness (and terrorism prevention), there is a push to devote monetary and non-monetary resources exclusively to enhance security. Doing so would diverge from a more appropriate focus of all-hazards and dual-use based approaches to domestic preparedness. Keeping the right focus while under pressure to make gains in national security presents a challenge that affects the sustainability of all domestic preparedness programs.

Domestic Preparedness and the Pre-9/11 Sustainability Challenge

Domestic preparedness comprises federal, state, and local programs that plan for and build capabilities to respond to terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland, especially attacks with weapons of mass destruction and disruption (WMD).¹ The programs began in earnest in 1996 with the Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, which was passed in reaction to the terrorist attacks against

David Grannis is a Senior Policy Advisor to Congresswoman Jane Harman on terrorism, intelligence, and defense issues.

the World Trade Center in New York City in 1993 and the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995.² Domestic preparedness now encompasses the development and maintenance of federal response capabilities as well as the training and equipping of first responders--those police officers, firefighters, emergency operations workers, environmental and HazMat personnel, nurses and doctors, emergency medical personnel, and public health employees who would be the first to come into contact with, for example, a chemical or biological weapon in the aftermath of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack. Limited progress was made between 1996 and 2001 in coordinating the response efforts of the first responders and governmental stakeholders. Mutual aid plans at the local level and intergovernmental coordination between federal, state, and local response entities are examples of these efforts.

Before the September 11 terrorist attacks and subsequent anthrax mailings, it seemed possible that the developing domestic preparedness programs would not be sustained.³ The absence of a large-scale terrorist attack or any incident involving WMD against the United States suggested that government attention and resources could be shifted from domestic preparedness to more immediate needs.⁴ The resulting concern was that either or both of two key components--operational readiness and program sustainability--could be degraded.

Operational readiness refers to the ability of the first responders to react quickly and efficiently, in a previously planned and rehearsed manner, to an event--whether a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or otherwise. Operational readiness requires that new personnel be trained and that all personnel keep up with best practices and changes in policy. It also means conducting exercises to test and practice domestic preparedness skills, and procuring, maintaining, and distributing equipment in working order. Because federal assets to support local WMD response are scattered throughout different departments, sustaining operational readiness is necessary

at the federal and local levels and must be maintained in the coordination between the two. The sustainability challenge is particularly acute when practitioners are not devoted solely to WMD response, as more common tasks will naturally divert attention, training time, and use of equipment.

Operational readiness depends on the amount of training, equipping, and integration of first responders at the local and regional levels; federal stocks of expertise, equipment, vaccines, and other medical treatments; legal authorization to act in maximally efficient ways; education of public officials and media outlets; a "surge capacity" to adapt hospitals and other facilities to WMD response, and a workable and tested response plan for possible scenarios of attack. WMD response readiness will tend to decline over time because individual pieces of equipment and training will deteriorate unless carefully monitored and maintained. Stockpiles of medications, vaccines, and antidotes can become obsolete over time, and equipment such as chemical and biological detectors, decontaminating materials, and protective suits eventually begin to degrade. Skills learned by first responders, if not practiced and enhanced, will fade to the point that practitioners are unable to follow established response protocols.

Program sustainability refers to the maintenance of adequate funding and effective management of preparedness programs and efforts to keep domestic preparedness as a policy priority. While local level funding for domestic preparedness is crucial and local communities provide the response capabilities, program sustainability is even more important at the federal level. State and local governments and agencies look to the federal government for financial support and provision of specialized equipment. Poor federal program support is likely to lead to poor local program sustainability. Like operational readiness, program sustainability is subject to changing forces such as the availability and willingness to spend government funds and other issues that occupy the time of policymakers.

A further challenge to program sustainability is the tension between federal and local responsibilities. The federal government has the greatest risk of facing a terrorist attack (as it faces risks across the entire country). Yet while the federal government plays a role in the management of the response, the initial handling of an event falls by necessity to local responders. The personnel who respond daily to injury, illness, and everyday hazards--who are not devoted exclusively to domestic preparedness--are the first responders in a terrorist event. And benefits associated with domestic preparedness efforts beyond WMD preparedness and response --such as improved public health monitoring and joint training of law enforcement and emergency response personnel --accrue at the local level. Thus both the federal and local governments must sustain a high level of domestic preparedness, despite each seeing the other as bearing more significant responsibility.

Domestic preparedness is unique among government programs because of the complexity of actors involved and skills and resources needed. Preparedness requires the integrated efforts of more than 40 federal departments and agencies, all U.S. states and territories, the private sector, and a large, diverse group of potential first responders. This complexity implies the need for oversight and coordination from the top, as well as bottom-up support from the responder groups and their local funders.

To accomplish the task of coordination, President George W. Bush appointed Governor Tom Ridge to direct the Office of Homeland Security. The executive order creating the office, signed on October 8, 2001, has the mission to "develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks." The Office of Homeland Security, however, was perceived to be an insufficient response to fighting a "war on terrorism." Thus in early June 2002, President George W. Bush proposed the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security. The Department of Homeland Security, once operational, will bear responsibility for coordinating efforts within its jurisdiction at the federal level and with state and local stakeholders.

The creation of the Office and Department of Homeland Security bodes well for sustaining domestic preparedness. The existence of dedicated government bodies ensures that domestic preparedness will continue to have institutional advocates, complete with budgetary authority and their own personnel to maintain.

Post-9/11 Sustainability Challenges

As a result of terrorist activity on and after September 11 and the enormous response across the United States the previous sustainability concerns--underinvestment and low priority for responders with more pressing daily tasks--have become irrelevant. Other developments, however, have created new challenges.

"Boom or Bust" Prioritization

The first sustainability challenge is the possible reemergence of an earlier concern: In the absence of new terrorist attacks or any significant homeland security threats in the next couple of years, lawmakers and first responders may turn away from domestic preparedness and focus on other needs. This is especially likely if the United States and its allies have continued success in dismantling al-Qaeda and other known terrorist groups. Current critics of past domestic preparedness efforts have pointed to the unwillingness of the government and the populace to sustain attention to terrorism, even after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1995 Oklahoma City attack, the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Africa, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole.

The huge increase that is expected in domestic preparedness funding at the federal, state, and local levels make future preparedness budgets a likely target for cuts. Funding for homeland security increased to \$38 billion in President Bush's 2003 budget, with an additional \$5.1 billion in a summer 2002 supplemental appropriation.⁵ These increases are matched by expanded budgets at state, county, and city levels across the country. Funding at the state level is especially precarious, as many states are experiencing budget shortfalls and are prevented by law from running operating deficits.

The likelihood of a boom to bust problem is, however, relatively low: Because further terrorist attacks against the United States are likely, the possibility of a drop in attention to domestic preparedness is less probable. And if not in the United States, attacks elsewhere in the world will keep attention on the specter of terrorism.

Second, organizational changes made since 9/11 greatly decrease the chance of lapses in program sustainability. As noted above, the creation of the Office and Department of Homeland Security, new homeland security positions in all U.S. states and many cities, and an increase in the number of security advisers in most federal departments have institutionalized the government's commitment to homeland security.

Third, the changes requested in the president's budget are mostly increases to agencies' base budgets rather than one-time purchases. This includes the \$3.5 billion requested for first responder support, meaning that the funds will spread beyond the Washington beltway. While the increase in domestic preparedness funding at all levels makes these accounts more attractive for politicians or responder group personnel to use in other ways, budgetary inertia will favor sustainability. The current military debate over eliminating "nontransformational" programs demonstrates the political difficulty in cutting any funding stream, regardless of its worth. The massive increases in funding support for domestic preparedness may be changed at the margins, but it is highly unlikely it will be seriously reduced.

Setting the Right Priorities

The sudden attention to homeland security has created a need to take steps to reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorist attack and to improve response capabilities. This is true for elected officials wishing to appear strong on security, for businesses seeking to minimize losses from a threatened consumer base, and for those who provide security--first responders and others--to demonstrate that they are able to both defeat terrorist plots and respond to attacks when they occur. With so much focus on domestic

preparedness (and terrorism prevention), there is a push to devote resources exclusively to security. This is largely based not on expertise (as the experience with domestic preparedness before 9/11 is insufficient to guide policymakers and security providers) but on perceived need.

The result of this new attention and need to react is a sustainability challenge to domestic preparedness. The concern is that preparedness will shift from its current focus of an all-hazards approach, which emphasizes functions that apply to terrorist and nonterrorist situations alike, to terrorism-specific initiatives. In addition, domestic preparedness may begin to move in the wrong direction. One possible pitfall is that the government will spend its energy preparing to counter the last attack rather than uncovering future threats. Another problem related to programmatic direction is the lack of prioritization. While airport security and anthrax response need to be improved, for example, they exist within a larger portfolio of security shortcomings. A knee-jerk reaction to bolster airport security, as embodied in the newly created Transportation Security Administration, will divert attention and resources from more general needs, such as improved intelligence and broad-based response capabilities. As media reports of threats and vulnerabilities emerge, domestic preparedness will veer from one need to another in an ad hoc manner, unless a strategy and prioritization of needs governs the system.

The following trends threaten to change the homeland security mission, resulting in less appropriate alternatives:

1. All Homeland Security, All the Time.

Merging twenty-two agencies into a Department of Homeland Security will bring focus to federal homeland security and domestic preparedness and should improve the coordination of federal, state, and local efforts. All of the agencies involved in the consolidation, however, have nonsecurity functions that must be preserved in the new department. The same dilemma plays out on the local scene: first responders have to be prepared to prevent and respond to terrorist activity, but they spend most of their time on other missions such as criminal investigation, fire fighting, and

nonterrorist-related search and rescue operations.

The pre-9/11 strategy was to have domestic preparedness mesh, to the greatest extent possible, with other first responder goals. The incident command system for structuring a response was needed as much for terrorism as it was for natural disasters and major fires. Interoperable radio communications assist any response effort involving multiple groups, regardless of the event. To some extent, single-use assets are required. Some post-9/11 efforts have provided assets used only for specific terrorism events, such as stockpiles of vaccine and increased use of WMD civil support teams. Policymakers, however, should rely to the greatest extent possible on dual-use preparations.

The focus on homeland security should not unduly divert funds or attention from other, more traditional functions. To the extent possible, equipment and procedures for domestic preparedness should also apply to other roles. Not only will this maximize efficiency of procurement and training, but also skills and equipment needed for domestic preparedness will be kept in good working order.

2. Fighting the Last War. Just as with the Department of Defense, the homeland security effort has placed undue focus on past attacks. For example, the Transportation Security Administration, established by Congress in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, is hiring tens of thousands of airport screeners and overrunning its original cost estimate of \$4.8 billion. At the same time, spending on port, rail, highway, and other transportation security has received little attention.

It is always easier to focus on security systems that have already failed, and the public has a right to expect improvements in systems that terrorists have exploited. Past attacks may not foreshadow future ones, however, and history is only one criterion of priorities for spending and action.

3. Doing too Much. The steps taken to prevent and prepare for further terrorist attacks have been far reaching, ad hoc, and conducted in

the absence of a good sense of threats, vulnerabilities, or priority needs. Without risk assessment and national domestic preparedness strategies in place, money and attention are likely to be lavished on targets or other needs that are extremely unlikely to come under attack.

Domestic preparedness has always faced the prospect of a low-probability, high-consequence attack--such as the attacks of September 11. Pre-9/11 domestic preparedness levels were an insurance policy in case response assets were needed; post-9/11 domestic preparedness is seen as response assets needed for future attacks. This view can be extended to preparing for an attack against every possible target, regardless of the likelihood that such an attack may occur. The total allocation of domestic preparedness funding, as well as prioritization among competing preparedness needs, should be subject to cost-benefit analyses and trade offs with other government and first responder missions.⁶

Recommendations

The following recommendations provide guidance on improving the sustainability of domestic preparedness programs and operations. Some recommendations will increase sustainability at the detriment of other objectives; others have relatively small costs.

Recommendation 1: Responsible Government Entity

Sustaining domestic preparedness will be easier if there is a clear organizational home for domestic preparedness issues and an entrenched organizational bureaucracy to fight for those interests. Disaggregated responsibility, as existed between 1996 and 2001, requires domestic preparedness supporters to fight among other agency responsibilities for attention and funding.

The establishment of a Department of Homeland Security would be a positive step toward the creation of a federal nexus for domestic preparedness. The departmental secretary would wield significant power, with a staff larger than all cabinet departments except the Defense Department and the Department

of Veterans Affairs, and an initial budget of roughly \$37.5 billion. The Department of Homeland Security would be an institutional force for the continued funding and priority of domestic preparedness, overcoming sustainability problems inherent in keeping domestic preparedness control in other departments with conflicting funding needs.

To maximize domestic preparedness sustainability, the Department of Homeland Security should ideally have its own dedicated (see recommendation 3) section in the president's budget request to Congress for annual spending. It would include its own research and development capabilities or funding mechanisms to dedicated research and development bases, and would be responsible for allocating grant programs to state and city governments and responder groups. The department would oversee exercises at the local and regional levels and conduct national exercises and simulations.⁷

Congressional reorganization is also necessary to oversee and fund an effective and efficient homeland security effort. As virtually every congressional committee in both the Senate and House can claim some jurisdiction over homeland security, consolidating responsibility or creating a select committee will require dedication from congressional leadership. Especially important for the sustainability of funding is the creation of an appropriations subcommittee for homeland security, to ensure consolidated oversight and action on the administration's budget request.

Recommendation 2: Operational Readiness Exercises and Evaluation

It is difficult to monitor and measure operational readiness to respond to emergencies. The Department of Homeland Security should work with states, cities, and first responder groups to develop metrics for measuring operational readiness. This will require identifying desired response capabilities and a judgment of who should be capable of performing what tasks.

Federal, state, and local response units should be judged against the developed metrics, as should federal offices providing training or equipment.⁸ Once objective measurements

are done, more attention can be given to maintaining equipment and changing current procedures to sustain the desired level of preparedness.

Simulation exercises are critical for training and for measuring readiness. Large-scale exercises involving agencies at all levels of government (like TOPOFF and Dark Winter) should occur annually. Smaller exercises at the state, county, or city level should be carried out periodically to test readiness and identify shortcomings in preparation. Provisions should be made to disseminate lessons learned from all exercises to responders and planners in other geographic areas. Exercises should be made as realistic as is functionally possible, but they should stop short of significantly interrupting the cities or towns where they are staged, as disruptions to everyday life will decrease local politicians' willingness to allow exercises to continue.⁹ Responders must be prevented from receiving information on exercises in advance, as prenotification undermines the ability to determine readiness and operate in underrealistic conditions.

Finally, money should be set aside in a dedicated fund to compensate federal, state, and local responder groups to replace equipment and supplies as needed. Waiting for the beginning of new accounting periods to replace used material will decrease readiness if stocks are depleted and flexible funding cannot replace materials until the next period.

Recommendation 3: Budget Preparation and Apportioning Responsibility

As part of the federal coordination process, the Office of Homeland Security or the Office of Management and Budget should prepare for Congress a description of all federal spending on domestic preparedness as part of a homeland security budget. A unified figure for the federal government's spending would provide Congress with a better picture of federal domestic preparedness efforts and would help pass parts of the total domestic preparedness budget through the congressional budget and appropriations processes.

Currently, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) collects general combating

terrorism budget data and WMD preparedness information from relevant agencies. WMD preparedness figures are divided into training and equipment for first responders, special response teams, federal planning and exercises, public health surveillance, and other relevant capabilities. This effort should be formalized and submitted to the relevant congressional subcommittees when formulating the annual budget.

Second, the Office of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Governors Association, city and county organizations, and first responder associations, must delineate federal responsibilities for domestic preparedness and state/local responsibilities. One sensible suggestion is to place the spending onus on the entity that derives the greatest everyday benefit from the product or service purchased.¹⁰

Recommendation 4: Dual Use and Leveraging

The structure and goals of domestic preparedness programs have great importance for the effort's sustainability. The goal of the programs should be to maximize the ability to prepare for and respond to a range of terrorist attacks or emergencies on U.S. territory to minimize damage.

For this goal to be realized in a sustained manner, local responders must be prepared to follow exacting procedures for extremely unlikely eventualities without degrading their daily operations. This implies a trade off between specialization and maximum readiness with attention to more commonplace needs. Domestic preparedness should thus be thought of as part of the existing "all hazards" approach to disaster management rather than as a separate entity, and to the maximum extent possible, domestic preparedness capabilities should be developed in ways that benefit other responsibilities. For example, improving domestic preparedness is nearly certain to improve public health, disaster response, law enforcement operations, military capabilities in contaminated environments, and international assistance capabilities.

As noted earlier, WMD response should be made the responsibility of those with related missions who are sure to be present when an attack occurs. Stockpiles of equipment maintained at the local level should be made available to nondomestic preparedness causes, provided there is a mandatory procedure for replacing them in a suitable time period. When equipment needed for domestic preparedness is not dual use, such as anthrax vaccines or sarin detectors, it should reside with specialists in emergency management (often at the county or state level) rather than with the usual first responders.

WMD response should also be included in relevant existing instruction programs for the response communities: the fire and police academies, medical school for doctors and nurses, and so forth.¹¹ Having all first responders pass examinations or take courses to develop their preparedness skills, and then requiring that all responders be certified in order to receive federal money, creates a baseline readiness standard and incentives for attaining it. Requiring recertification at intervals of two or three years will also help to sustain readiness.

Personnel in state emergency preparedness offices and at the county level should be made responsible for monitoring and coordinating the domestic preparedness efforts among the traditional responder community (firefighters, police, HazMat workers), the public health and medical communities, and the media.

Recommendation 5: Institutionalization

To the extent possible, domestic preparedness needs to become institutionalized and/or automated within the participating communities. Creating protocols or automated tasks that increase response effectiveness will decrease the chance that sustainability will fail. Some of these protocols will require the responder community to change standard procedures, such as requiring personnel to wear extra protective clothing and requiring responding departments to bring weapon detectors to deployment sites. Other protocols, such as notifying specific people upon a high level of hospital admittance or unusual veterinarian activity, may be automated through

computer protocols triggered by data entry. To the extent that technologies can be used independent of human activity (e.g., detectors placed in strategic sites to monitor WMD and relay results to a central facility), automation can replace training or attention without risking sustainability.

Because not all responders can be sufficiently trained in the use of domestic preparedness equipment or procedures, one or more federal agencies, as coordinated by the offices identified in recommendations 1 and 2, should publish "procedure sheets" for various circumstances. A sole agency, preferably the Federal Emergency Management Agency due to its lead responsibility in federal-state-local coordination could, for example, mimic the military's practice of codifying maintenance standards for equipment to instruct the personnel charged with maintaining equipment caches. The Centers for Disease Control has begun, and should continue, to take responsibility for publishing guidelines to be distributed to every hospital in the country for identifying and treating suspected diseases or chemical reactions.¹²

Finally, WMD response should be made part of the training that firefighters, police, HazMat workers, public health personnel, doctors, and nurses are required to complete before employment. While this instruction is conducted locally and is sometimes private, federal legislation should mandate that standards for training be set by the relevant federal agencies and that training academies be trained directly by the federal experts.¹³

Conclusion

The post-9/11 environment drives policymakers and first responders to emphasize domestic preparedness programs and priority. This focus on preventing and preparing for future terrorist attacks--without regard to long-term sustainability or efficiency of the system--raises the real possibility that efforts undertaken now either will not survive or will be inefficient or counterproductive later.

To create and shape a system in which domestic preparedness continues to work and leverage everyday needs, sustainability must be included as an integral part of the effort. The major needs for sustainability are an institutional advocate for domestic preparedness, an emphasis on an all-hazards approach, and a way to keep training and equipping for WMD response as a regular part of first responder functions.

The creation of a Department of Homeland Security is a critical step in ensuring sustainability, especially in the fight for federal funding for domestic preparedness programs. A strengthened White House coordination role through the Office of Homeland Security or Homeland Security Council, is also necessary to ensure the proper integration of domestic preparedness efforts across the federal government.

Finally, the nature of domestic preparedness as an all-hazards program must be preserved. Rather than WMD response being added to a long list of training and equipment needs for police, fire, medical, and other emergency workers, the tools and procedures for domestic preparedness should be grafted to everyday needs. Only by using dual-use equipment and overlaying WMD response actions can responders and their equipment remain ready for an emergency on a sustained basis.

This project was supported by Grant No. 1999-MU-CX-0008 awarded by the Office for Domestic Preparedness, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, coordinates the activities of the following program offices or bureaus: the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

NOTES

1 Weapons of mass destruction, as defined in this paper, include chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons; conventional explosives in large quantities; and cyberattacks. The characteristics of biological and chemical weapons, including principally the possibility to significantly mitigate consequences with prompt action after an attack, make these two classes the most relevant for domestic preparedness.

2 The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act was part of the Fiscal Year 1997 Defense Authorization Act signed on September 23, 1996 (Public Law 104-201). It is more commonly referred to as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment.

3 See, for example, Richard A. Falkenrath, "The Problems of Preparedness: Challenges Facing the U.S. Domestic Preparedness Program," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Discussion Paper 2000-28 (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, December 2000); and Amy E. Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy, *Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the U.S. Response* (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, October 2000).

4 The use of anthrax (unsuccessfully) and sarin (with moderate success) by Aum Shinrikyo created some concern among U.S. policymakers and provided a climate for the passage of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment. The Rajneeshee cult used salmonella to influence local voting in Wasco County, Oregon, but with little national attention or repercussions. See, for example, Jonathan Tucker, ed., *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000).

5 The \$5.1 billion appropriation, which was part of a supplemental spending package for homeland security and defense, was rejected by President George W. Bush on August 13, 2002. "Bush Rejects \$5.1 billion in Spending," CNN (August 13, 2002) at <www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/08/13/bush.spending/index.html>

6 For a treatment of risk analysis in determining domestic preparedness spending, see Richard A. Falkenrath, "Analytic Models and Policy Prescription: Understanding Recent Innovation in U.S. Counterterrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* Vol. 24, No. 3 (2001), pp. 159-181.

7 The Office of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Council, and any other future White House groups charged with overseeing and coordinating homeland security efforts across the federal bureaucracy, will still be a necessary component even after the creation of a department. No consolidation can include all federal homeland security functions, and the secretary of homeland security cannot direct or coordinate programs in other departments.

8 Measuring requires that some entity be available to assess the results. Possible groups to conduct judgments are private or nonprofit institutions, state governors' offices, and federal organizations such as the Government Accounting Office and the Office of Management and Budget.

9 Where technically and legally feasible, the Office of Homeland Security and the federal office for domestic preparedness operations should identify harmless chemicals and bacteria that can be used in simulations and exercises to replicate the experience of an attack. This will not only provide better experience in measuring and educating first responders about contamination and detection, but will also provide a danger-free way of making the responders more comfortable with WMD response. Exercises with real but harmless agents has unfortunate precedent in tests done in California to test bacterial dissemination, which was problematic more for its exposure of the unwitting public to bacterial agents. Domestic preparedness exercises should minimize actual agent contact with the general public to minimize public hysteria and civil liberties infringements. Involvement in WMD exercises should never be allowed to interfere with the primary jobs of first responders, and contingency plans should be made for adjusting exercises if a real emergency occurs. Similarly, exercises should not be designed to unduly hamper normal traffic or other everyday activities.

10 Ivo H. Daalder, I.M. Destler, David L. Gunter, Paul C. Light, Robert E. Litan, Michael E. O'Hanlon, Peter R. Orszag, James B. Steinberg, *Protecting the American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2002).

11 See also Amy E. Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy, *Ataxia*, Chapter 7.

12 Ibid. chap. 6.

13 Ibid. pp. 298-303.

Executive Session Members

Professor Graham T. Allison

Professor of Government and Director
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Kennedy School of Government

Professor Alan Altshuler

Professor of Urban Policy and Planning and Director
Taubman Center for State and Local Government
Kennedy School of Government

Mr. Thomas Antush

Senior Program Analyst
Transportation Security Administration
U.S. Department of Transportation

Dr. Joseph Barbera

Clinical Associate Professor of Emergency Medicine
George Washington University

Mr. Bruce Baughman

Director, Office of National Preparedness
Federal Emergency Management Agency

Mr. Peter Beering

Indianapolis Terrorism Preparedness Coordinator

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Thomas N. Burnette, Jr.

Former Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces
Command

Professor Ashton B. Carter

Professor of Science and International Affairs,
Kennedy School of Government

Mr. Hank Christen

Emergency Response Consultant,
Unconventional Concepts, Inc., FL

Chief Rebecca Denlinger

Chief, Cobb County Fire Department, GA

Major General (Ret.) John Fenimore

Former Adjutant General, New York National Guard

Ms. Ellen Gordon

Administrator, Iowa Emergency Management Division

Dr. Margaret Hamburg

Vice President for Biological Programs
Nuclear Threat Initiative, Washington, DC

Mayor Clarence Harmon

Former Mayor, City of St. Louis, MO

Mr. Francis X. Hartmann

Executive Director, Program in Criminal Justice Policy/
Management and Malcolm Wiener Center for Social Policy,
Kennedy School of Government

Professor Philip Heymann

Professor of Law, Harvard Law School

Dr. Arnold M. Howitt

Executive Director, Taubman Center for State and
Local Government, Kennedy School of Government

Ms. Juliette Kayyem

Executive Director, Executive Session on Domestic
Preparedness, Kennedy School of Government

Dr. Robert Knouss

Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Peter LaPorte

Director, District of Columbia Emergency Management
Agency

Major General Bruce M. Lawlor

Senior Director for Protection and Prevention
Office of Homeland Security

Dr. Marcelle Layton

Assistant Commissioner, Bureau of Communicable
Disease, New York City Department of Health

Dr. Scott Lilibridge

Professor and Director, Center for Biosecurity
University of Texas Health Science Center
School of Public Health

Mr. John Magaw

Former Undersecretary of Transportation for Security
U.S. Department of Transportation

Chief Paul Maniscalco

Deputy Chief, New York City Emergency Medical
Services Command

Mr. Gary McConnell

Director, Georgia Emergency Management Agency

Mr. Stanley McKinney

Vice President for Business Continuity Management
Bank of America

Professor Matthew S. Meselson

Professor of the Natural Sciences, Harvard University

Dr. Steven Miller

Director, International Security Program,
Kennedy School of Government

Mr. Andrew Mitchell

Deputy Director, Office for Domestic Preparedness,
Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice

Major General Paul D. Monroe, Jr.

Adjutant General, California National Guard

Major General Phillip E. Oates

Adjutant General, Alaska National Guard

Chief Charles Ramsey

Chief, Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, DC

Lieutenant General (Ret.) James Terry Scott

Partner, Watson and Associates, TX

Ms. Leslee Stein-Spencer

Chief, Division of Emergency Medical Services and
Highway Safety, Illinois Department of Public Health

Chief Darrel Stephens

Chief, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, NC

Dr. Jessica Stern

Lecturer in Public Policy, Kennedy School of Government

Chief Steve Storment

Assistant Chief, Phoenix Fire Department, AZ

Sheriff Patrick J. Sullivan, Jr.

Sheriff, Arapahoe County, CO

Mr. Ralph Timperi

Assistant Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of
Public Health and Director, Massachusetts Department of
Public Health State Laboratory

Chief Alan D. Vickery

Deputy Chief, Special Operations,
Seattle Fire Department, WA

Dr. Frances Winslow

Director, Office of Emergency Services, San Jose, CA

Executive Session Staff

Arnold M. Howitt
Director

Rebecca Storo
Assistant Director

Rebecca Horne
Project Assistant

Juliette Kayyem
Executive Director

Patricia Chang
Research Assistant